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JUSTICE BY LUCK:  
HOW UNCLEAR RECORDS FORCE  
SOME UNLUCKY PRISONERS TO  
SERVE UNCONSTITUTIONAL SENTENCES  
IN THE WAKE OF JOHNSON V. UNITED STATES 
INTRODUCTION 
The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) imposes mandatory minimum 
sentences on individuals convicted of being a felon in possession of a 
firearm who have at least three prior convictions for “violent felon[ies].”1 
“Violent felon[ies]” include those crimes contemplated by the ACCA’s 
“residual clause,”2 which sweeps in any crime that “involves conduct that 
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”3 The 
Supreme Court ruled that the residual clause was unconstitutional in 
Johnson v. United States in 2015.4 As the decision in Johnson was 
retroactive,5 individuals whose sentences were enhanced on the basis of the 
residual clause may seek relief under Johnson.6 
In affording such relief, however, the circuits disagree as to what 
standard of proof should apply to the question of whether a sentence 
enhancement was in fact based on the residual clause.7 Some circuits have 
held that a movant8 must show only that his sentence enhancement “may 
have” been based on the residual clause in order to have the sentence 
vacated.9 Other circuits, however, have held that a movant must meet the 
higher preponderance-of-the-evidence standard by showing that the judge 
more than likely relied on the residual clause in handing down the 
 
1. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2018). 
2. Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1261 (2016) (referring to the final clause of § 
924(e)(2)(B)(ii) as the “residual clause”).  
3. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), invalidated by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).  
4. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2563.  
5. Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1265. 
6. See, e.g., United States v. Muna, No. 3:13-CR-0100-SLG, 2017 WL 357304, at *4 (D. Alaska 
Jan. 24, 2017) (vacating sentence enhancement imposed on the basis of the ACCA’s residual clause), 
aff’d, 740 F. App’x 539 (9th Cir. 2018). 
7. See Walker v. United States, 900 F.3d 1012, 1014 (8th Cir. 2018) (noting circuit split over 
standard of proof required to obtain relief under Johnson).  
8. Prisoners seeking relief under Johnson who have exhausted their direct appeals must file a 
motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See infra note 38. Accordingly, this Note refers to prisoners 
seeking relief under Johnson as “movants.” 
9. United States v. Peppers, 899 F.3d 211, 236 (3d Cir. 2018); United States v. Geozos, 870 
F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 2017); United States v. Winston, 850 F.3d 677, 682 (4th Cir. 2017). This lower 
standard of proof is referred to as the “may-have” standard throughout this Note.  











sentence.10 In 2019, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Clay chose sides in 
the circuit split by adopting the harsher preponderance-of-the-evidence 
standard.11 This Note uses the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Clay as a 
springboard for analyzing the consequences of the preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard.12  
Part I of this Note contains an overview of the ACCA and its history, the 
law governing collateral review of federal criminal sentences, and the 
reactions of other courts of appeals immediately following Johnson, as well 
as an analysis of the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Clay.13 Part II of this Note 
makes two main arguments for why Clay was wrongly decided.14 The first 
is that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard announced in Clay is 
grounded in a misunderstanding of the presumption of finality in collateral 
review, as claims for relief under Johnson represent precisely the type of 
scenario in which the presumption of finality should give way.15 The second 
argument is that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard is unfair 
because it leads to inconsistent results in which some unlucky movants who 
were sentenced under the residual clause must remain in prison to serve out 
unconstitutional sentences due to unclear sentencing records, a problem 
exacerbated by the Supreme Court’s decisions prior to Johnson.16  
To remedy the problems presented by the preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard, this Note proposes a two-part solution in Part III.17 First, 
the Supreme Court should weigh in on this issue in order to resolve the split 
among the circuits and clarify that the correct standard of proof on collateral 
review under Johnson is the lower may-have standard.18 Second, in order to 
prevent similar injustices in the future, the Supreme Court should extend the 
 
10. Walker, 900 F.3d at 1015; United States v. Washington, 890 F.3d 891, 896 (10th Cir. 2018); 
Dimott v. United States, 881 F.3d 232, 243 (1st Cir. 2018); Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215, 
1221–22 (11th Cir. 2017). Courts appear to use the terms “preponderance of the evidence” and “more 
likely than not” interchangeably in this context. See, e.g., Washington, 890 F.3d at 896 (“[W]e hold the 
burden is on the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence—i.e., that it is more likely than 
not—his claim relies on Johnson.”). For the sake of consistency, this Note refers to this higher standard 
as the “preponderance-of-the-evidence” standard. 
11. United States v. Clay, 921 F.3d 550, 558–59 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 866 
(2020) (mem.). 
12. Most of the same criticisms are applicable to every decision in which a court of appeals has 
adopted the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. This Note focuses on the decision in Clay, 
however, because the Fifth Circuit’s ambivalence and hesitance to choose a standard in the years 
preceding Clay exacerbated the problem and illustrates the need for clarity from the Supreme Court on 
this and similar issues. See infra text accompanying notes 55–60.  
13. See infra Part I.  
14. See infra Part II.  
15. See infra Section II.A. 
16. See infra Section II.B.  
17. See infra Part III.  












principle first elucidated in Stromberg v. California19 to situations such as 
the one presented in Clay.20 
I. BACKGROUND  
A. The Armed Career Criminal Act 
Under federal law, it is a crime for a person who has been convicted of 
a felony21 to possess a firearm.22 The ACCA imposes mandatory fifteen-
year minimum sentences upon felons convicted of possessing a firearm who 
have three or more prior convictions for “a violent felony or a serious drug 
offense, or both.”23 The meaning of “violent felony”—both as defined in the 
statute and as interpreted by the courts—has undergone numerous revisions 
since the ACCA was first enacted in 1984.24  
Under the law’s current formulation, there are three ways in which a 
conviction can qualify as a “violent felony” (or, in the language of the 
courts, a “predicate offense”25) under the ACCA.26 First, under 
 
19. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931). The Stromberg principle holds that, when 
a jury convicts on a general verdict with multiple possible legal bases, at least one of which is later 
determined to be unconstitutional, that conviction must be vacated if the basis for the jury’s verdict 
cannot be determined with certainty. Id. This Note argues that this principle should be extended to apply 
not just to jury verdicts but to any criminal conviction or sentence. For a longer discussion of the 
Stromberg principle, see infra note 139 and accompanying text.  
20. See infra Part III. 
21. By its explicit terms, § 922(g) applies to persons who have been convicted of “a crime 
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2018). This 
threshold coincides with the definition of a felony under the federal criminal law. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a) 
(2018).  
22. § 922(g). Violation of § 922(g) has the additional element of a nexus with interstate 
commerce, but this jurisdictional requirement is a low bar. See Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 
2196 (2019) (describing purpose of § 922(g)’s interstate commerce element as “simply [to] ensure that 
the Federal Government has the constitutional authority to regulate the defendant’s conduct”); 
Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 575 (1977) (holding that similarly worded jurisdictional 
element in predecessor to § 922(g) required only “the minimal nexus that the firearm have been, at some 
time, in interstate commerce”).  
23. § 924(e). In addition to a minimum duration of fifteen years, sentences under the ACCA may 
not be suspended or probationary. Id. The ordinary maximum sentence for conviction of being a felon 
in possession of a firearm is ten years. § 924(a)(2). As such, the immediate practical effect of a sentence 
enhancement under the ACCA is to add at least five years to a sentence’s duration. 
24. See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (discussing changes to the definition 
of “violent felony” under the ACCA); Jondavid S. DeLong, Annotation, What Constitutes “Violent 
Felony” for Purpose of Sentence Enhancement Under Armed Career Criminal Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 
924(e)(1)), 119 A.L.R. Fed. 319 (1994). The meaning of “serious drug offense” has also undergone 
numerous revisions and is likewise ripe for discussion. See United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377 
(2008) (discussing history of changes to the definition of “serious drug offense” under the ACCA). 
However, only the meaning of “violent felony” under the ACCA is relevant for the purposes of this 
Note. 
25. See, e.g., Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 21 (2005).  
26. § 924(e)(2)(B). The statute defines “violent felony” as follows: 
 











§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (the “elements clause”27), crimes that have the use of force 
as an element (whether actual, threatened or attempted) are predicate 
offenses.28 Second, subsection (ii) names specific crimes that are predicate 
offenses.29 These enumerated offenses are burglary, arson, extortion, and 
any crime that “involves use of explosives.”30 Third, and finally, subsection 
(ii) also contains the ACCA’s residual clause, which makes any crime that 
“otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical 
injury to another” a predicate offense.31 
When determining whether a given crime is a predicate offense, courts 
use a “categorical approach,” meaning that courts do not consider the facts 
of the particular instance of the crime giving rise to the conviction; instead, 
courts consider only the elements of the offense in the abstract.32 Thus, 
whether a felony was actually accomplished in a violent manner is irrelevant 
to residual clause analysis.33 What matters instead is whether an “idealized 
 
[T]he term “violent felony” means any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding 
one year, or any act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or carrying of a firearm, knife, 
or destructive device that would be punishable by imprisonment for such term if committed by 
an adult, that— 
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the 
person of another; or 
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves 
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another . . . . 
Id. It is worth noting that, although the ACCA is itself a federal crime, state crimes can also qualify as 
predicate offenses. See, e.g., Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544, 555 (2019) (holding that Florida 
robbery statute is an ACCA predicate offense). Indeed, as this Note will explain, the courts’ struggles to 
square the ACCA with the diverse criminal law schemes of the fifty states and other territories is 
precisely what has given rise to the controversy that is the focus of this Note. See infra Section II.B.2. 
27. Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1261 (2016). 
28. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).  
29. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).  
30. Id. 
31. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
32. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990). This categorical approach is necessary 
due, in part, to Sixth Amendment concerns. See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2252 (2016) 
(“Second, a construction of ACCA allowing a sentencing judge to go any further [than the elements of 
the offense] would raise serious Sixth Amendment concerns. This Court has held that only a jury, and 
not a judge, may find facts that increase a maximum penalty, except for the simple fact of a prior 
conviction.” (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000))). If judges were to consider 
whether the particular facts giving rise to a prior conviction constitute a predicate offense, it would 
encroach upon the constitutionally mandated purview of the jury. Id. The categorical approach is 
designed to solve this problem by having judges consider whether a conviction counts as a predicate 
offense as a matter of law, but some (including Justice Thomas) have suggested that having judges find 
even the fact of conviction runs afoul of the Sixth Amendment. See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 
1253–54 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The categorical approach . . . created the same Sixth 
Amendment problem that it tried to avoid. . . . In my view, if the Government wants to enhance a 
defendant’s sentence based on his prior convictions, it must put those convictions in the indictment and 
prove them to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”).  
33. In Taylor, the Supreme Court discussed how the categorical approach decouples ACCA 













ordinary case” of the crime, as determined by analyzing the text of the 
statute in a vacuum,34 “involves conduct that presents a serious potential 
risk of physical injury to another.”35 Due to uncertainty created by a reliance 
upon this “judicially imagined ‘ordinary case’” of a crime, as well as a lack 
of a satisfying standard for how risky a crime must be to qualify as a “violent 
crime,” in 2015 the Supreme Court struck down the ACCA’s residual clause 
as unconstitutionally vague in Johnson v. United States.36  
B. Collateral Attacks in Federal Criminal Cases 
While all of the Supreme Court’s decisions creating new rules apply 
automatically to criminal cases that are still pending on direct appeal, only 
some decisions—namely, substantive rules of law and certain “watershed” 
procedural rules—apply retroactively to cases in which judgements are 
final.37 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255—the modern codification of the writ of 
habeas corpus for federal prisoners38—a federal prisoner may file a motion 
to have his sentence vacated, set aside, or corrected if it was “imposed in 
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.”39 As such, a 
Supreme Court decision announcing a new rule of law can afford retroactive 
 
“[Congressional] concern [regarding career offenders] was not limited to offenders who had actually 
been convicted of crimes of violence against persons. (Only H.R. 4768, rejected by the House 
Subcommittee, would have restricted the predicate offenses to crimes actually involving violence against 
persons.)” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 588. 
34. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2561 (2015).  
35. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
36. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557–58. The Court cited two fatal flaws in the residual clause. Id. at 
2557. First, the requirement that judges employ the categorical approach in determining the risk an 
“ordinary case” of a given offense leads to “grave uncertainty.” Id. Second, even if judges could 
determine with certainty the risk posed by a given offense, there is no clear standard for what level of 
risk is required for an offense to qualify as a predicate offense. Id. at 2558.  
37. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351–52 (2004). The Court in Schriro wrote:  
When a decision of this Court results in a “new rule,” that rule applies to all criminal cases still 
pending on direct review. As to convictions that are already final, however, the rule applies 
only in limited circumstances. New substantive rules generally apply retroactively. This 
includes decisions that narrow the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its terms, as well 
as constitutional determinations that place particular conduct or persons covered by the statute 
beyond the State’s power to punish. 
Id. (internal citations omitted).  
38. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 774–75 (2008) (noting that § 2255 “replaced 
traditional habeas corpus for federal prisoners . . . with a process that allowed the prisoner to file a motion 
with the sentencing court on the ground that his sentence was” imposed unconstitutionally). Strictly 
speaking, a § 2255 motion is not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See United States v. Hayman, 
342 U.S. 205, 220 (1952) (noting that a hearing pursuant to § 2255 “is not a habeas corpus proceeding”). 
Nonetheless, courts commonly refer to § 2255 motions as “habeas” motions, and this Note follows this 
convention where appropriate for clarity’s sake. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 95 F.3d 54, 54 (5th 
Cir. 1996) (referring to a § 2255 motion as a “federal habeas motion”).  
39. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2018).  











relief even in a case that is already final, as long as the new rule of law is 
deemed to be substantive or, if procedural, a “watershed” decision.40 
While § 2255 creates a path to collateral relief, that path is beset by 
judicial and legislative hurdles. The law governing collateral relief is 
undergirded by a “presumption of finality and legality” that attaches to a 
criminal conviction once direct appeals have been completed, and, as such, 
movants face a high burden on collateral attack.41 This presumption was 
further strengthened by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
of 1996 (AEDPA).42 AEDPA, for example, imposes a “strict statute of 
limitations” that time-bars movants’ claims for relief, which courts may 
invoke sua sponte even when the government has failed to raise the 
timeliness issue.43 The presumption of finality, especially in light of 
AEDPA, animates much of the law of collateral review today.44  
C. Post-Johnson Collateral Attacks on Sentences Based upon the Residual 
Clause 
While the Court’s decision in Johnson striking down the residual clause 
of the ACCA as unconstitutional applied automatically to cases that were 
still pending on direct appeal, it was unclear whether the ruling would apply 
retroactively as a substantive rule of law.45 A year after its decision in 
Johnson, the Court resolved the question in Welch v. United States, holding 
that the decision in Johnson created a substantive rule of law that applied 
retroactively on collateral attack.46 Accordingly, individuals who received 
 
40. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 351–52.  
41.  Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633 (1993) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 
887 (1983)); see also Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 887 (“The role of federal habeas proceedings, while 
important in assuring that constitutional rights are observed, is secondary and limited.”).  
42. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. 
See also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000) (noting it is “AEDPA’s purpose to further the 
principle[] of . . . finality”). 
43. Dimott v. United States, 881 F.3d 232, 238 (1st Cir. 2018) (citing Wood v. Milyard, 566 U.S. 
463, 473 (2012); Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 209 (2006)); 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Other burdens 
AEDPA places on movants include the inability to appeal the denial of a § 2255 motion unless movant 
first procures a “certificate of appealability” from the denying district court. § 2253(c). As this Note is 
concerned with the standard of proof for a § 2255, AEDPA requirements such as these are beyond the 
scope of this Note, except for the extent to which such requirements are emblematic of the general 
harshness of AEDPA. 
44. See Dimott, 881 F.3d at 241 (“We think the focus must be on the fact that we are applying 
clear limits established by Congress for when federal post-conviction petitions may be entertained by 
the federal courts . . . .”).  
45. Compare In re Watkins, 810 F.3d 375, 383–84 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that Johnson created 
a new substantive rule of law that applies retroactively on collateral review), with In re Williams, 806 
F.3d 322, 325–26 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that Johnson did not create a new substantive rule of law that 
applies retroactively on collateral review).  












enhanced sentences because of the ACCA’s residual clause are entitled to 
relief under Johnson, even if they have exhausted their direct appeals.47  
When movants began bringing Johnson challenges to ACCA sentence 
enhancements, courts disagreed as to the standard of proof a movant must 
meet in asserting that his sentence was enhanced on the basis of the now-
unconstitutional residual clause.48 Some circuits, namely the Third, Fourth, 
and Ninth, have held that a movant is entitled to relief if he can demonstrate 
that the sentencing court “may have” relied on the residual clause.49 These 
circuits rested their holdings on appeals to fairness and equal application of 
the law, reasoning that movants who may have been sentenced 
unconstitutionally should be entitled to review of whether they were in fact 
sentenced unconstitutionally.50  
Other circuits, including the First, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh, 
have required instead that movants demonstrate by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the sentencing court relied upon the residual clause in handing 
down the ACCA sentence enhancement.51 These circuits justified this 
higher standard of proof by invoking movants’ high burden in habeas 
proceedings and by referencing the general principle of finality, as 
manifested in the harshness of AEDPA.52 The Supreme Court has refused 
to address the split,53 and as such, different circuits are deciding cases 
seeking post-Johnson relief under both the may-have and the 
preponderance-of-the-evidence standards.54 
 
47. See, e.g., United States v. Teeples, No. 02-45-M-DWM, 2016 WL 4147139, at *2 (D. Mont. 
Aug. 3, 2016). In Teeples, the movant’s conviction became final on May 15, 2006, more than nine years 
before Johnson was decided. Id. The court nonetheless granted relief under Johnson and Welch, id. at 
*4, because “[n]ew substantive constitutional rules and new watershed procedural constitutional rules 
apply to all cases, even if they are already final at the time the new rule is announced,” id. at *2. 
48. Compare Walker v. United States, 900 F.3d 1012, 1015 (8th Cir. 2018) (adopting 
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard), with United States v. Geozos, 870 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 
2017) (adopting may-have standard).  
49. United States v. Peppers, 899 F.3d 211, 223 (3d Cir. 2018); United States v. Winston, 850 
F.3d 677, 682 (4th Cir. 2017); Geozos, 870 F.3d at 896.  
50. See, e.g., Winston, 850 F.3d at 682 (finding that “imposing the burden on movants urged by 
the government in the present case would result in selective application of the new rule of constitutional 
law announced in [Johnson], violating the principle of treating similarly situated defendants the same” 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Chance, 831 F.3d 1335, 1341 (11th Cir. 2016))).  
51. Walker, 900 F.3d at 1015; United States v. Washington, 890 F.3d 891, 896 (10th Cir. 2018); 
Dimott v. United States, 881 F.3d 232, 241–42 (1st Cir. 2018); Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215, 
1221–22 (11th Cir. 2017).  
52. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.  
53. See, e.g., Clay v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 866, 866 (2020) (mem.) (denying petition for writ 
of certiorari).  
54. Compare Morrison v. United States, No. 16-CV-1517 DMS, 2019 WL 2472520, at *6 (S.D. 
Cal. June 12, 2019) (applying may-have standard), with Einfeldt v. United States, No. C16-2051-LRR, 
2018 WL 10124648, at *3 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 10, 2018) (applying preponderance-of-the-evidence 
standard).  











D. The Fifth Circuit’s Decision in United States v. Clay 
Prior to April 2019, the Fifth Circuit had equivocated with respect to 
choosing a standard of proof on post-Johnson claims.55 In United States v. 
Taylor, decided in 2017, the Fifth Circuit described the competing 
arguments at length before concluding that it need not choose a standard 
because the movant’s claims had satisfied both.56 In the next relevant case 
to come before the Fifth Circuit, United States v. Wiese, the court again 
declined to choose a standard, but this time for the opposite reason: the 
movant’s claims in that case would have failed under either standard.57 The 
decision in Wiese did advance the Fifth Circuit’s caselaw in at least one 
respect, though, as the court adopted a precedent from the Tenth Circuit 
recognizing that courts, in addition to looking at “the sentencing record for 
direct evidence of a sentence,” may also look to “the relevant background 
legal environment that existed at the time of [the defendant’s] sentencing.”58 
Thus, even if the record is silent, courts may nevertheless attempt to divine 
the basis on which the sentencing judge applied the ACCA sentence 
enhancement.59 It was on this basis—as opposed to on the basis of the 
record, which was silent as to the clause under which movant’s sentence 
was enhanced—that the Fifth Circuit dismissed movant’s § 2255 motion.60  
 
55. United States v. Clay, 921 F.3d 550, 555 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. at 866 
(“[W]e have yet to ‘conclusively decide’ which standard of proof applies.” (quoting United States v. 
Wiese, 896 F.3d 720, 724–25 (5th Cir. 2018)). Not all circuits have yet picked a side. See Acosta v. 
United States, No. 1:03-CR-00011-MAT, 2019 WL 4140943, at *7 n.7 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2019) (“The 
Second Circuit has not addressed the petitioner’s burden . . . .”); Sotelo v. United States, 922 F.3d 848, 
855 (7th Cir. 2019) (declining to consider the question because movant “could not satisfy even 
[Peppers’s and Geozos’s] liberal standard of demonstrating that he might have been sentenced under the 
residual clause”). The Sixth Circuit seemed initially to adopt the preponderance-of-the-evidence 
standard, but an intra-circuit split has since splintered that court’s caselaw in a manner that is beyond 
the scope of this Note. See Raines v. United States, 898 F.3d 680, 685–86 (6th Cir. 2018) (limiting the 
holding of an earlier decision in which the Sixth Circuit adopted the preponderance-of-the-evidence 
standard).  
56. United States v. Taylor, 873 F.3d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 2017).  
57. Wiese, 896 F.3d at 724–25. While the Fifth Circuit did not choose a side in Wiese, it did 
express a preference for the higher standard in dicta, writing: “We note that the ‘more likely than not’ 
standard appears to be the more appropriate standard since it comports with the general civil standard 
for review and with the stringent and limited approach of AEDPA to successive habeas applications.” 
Id. at 724. 
58. Id. at 725 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting United States v. 
Washington, 890 F.3d 891, 896 (10th Cir. 2018)).  
59. The Ninth Circuit gave the following illustration of the “background legal environment” 
concept: 
If, for instance, binding circuit precedent at the time of sentencing was that crime Z qualified 
as a violent felony under the force clause, then a court's failure to invoke the force clause 
expressly at sentencing, when there were three predicate convictions for crime Z, would not 
render unclear the ground on which the court's ACCA determination rested. 
United States v. Geozos, 870 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 2017).  












In United States v. Clay, decided in April of 2019, the Fifth Circuit chose 
a side, joining those circuits that had adopted the preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard.61 The movant in that case, Glen B. Clay, was convicted 
of being a felon in possession of a firearm.62 The charging document and 
the presentence report at trial both indicated that Clay was subject to 
sentence enhancement under the ACCA, and Clay’s lawyer conceded that 
Clay had at least three prior convictions for predicate offenses, which 
ordinarily would trigger a sentence enhancement under the ACCA.63 While 
the fact of Clay’s prior convictions was not contested, the record at trial 
contained no documentation indicating which of Clay’s numerous prior 
state-law convictions were the predicate offenses for his sentence 
enhancement.64 In the words of the Fifth Circuit, “[B]ecause Clay’s counsel 
conceded at his hearing that the ACCA applied, there was no occasion for 
the sentencing court to clarify how the requisite ‘violent felonies’ were 
tabulated.”65 The trial court applied the ACCA enhancement, sentencing 
Clay to prison for 235 months—more than nineteen years.66 Clay filed direct 
appeals and an initial § 2255 motion on other grounds, but he did not 
succeed in having his conviction overturned or his sentence reduced.67  
Following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Johnson and Welch, 
however, Clay filed a successive68 § 2255 motion, in which Clay also 
requested that the district court obtain documents that would shed light on 
the predicate offenses that formed the basis of his sentence enhancement.69 
Without obtaining such documents, the district court denied Clay’s motion 
 
61. United States v. Clay, 921 F.3d 550 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 866, 866 (2020) 
(mem.). 
62. Id. at 553. 
63. Id.  
64. Id. at 555–56. 
65. Id. at 556. 
66. Id. at 553. 
67. Id.  
68. Under AEDPA, successive (i.e. subsequent) § 2255 motions are treated differently than 
initial § 2255 motions. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b), 2255(h) (2018); see also United States v. Driscoll, 892 
F.3d 1127, 1135 n.5 (10th Cir. 2018) (“In the context of a second or successive § 2255 motion, there are 
procedural hurdles not present when filing a first § 2255 motion.”). This is a reflection of the general 
principle that AEDPA gives movants “one bite at the post-conviction apple” on collateral attack. 
Trenkler v. United States, 536 F.3d 85, 100 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d 
34, 57 (1st Cir. 1999)). In this context, however, the distinction is largely without a difference, as many 
courts that have confronted the issue have determined that the same standard of proof for determining 
whether a sentencing judge relied upon the residual clause should apply on initial and successive § 2255 
petitions. See, e.g., Driscoll, 892 F.3d at 1135 n.5 (10th Cir. 2018) (adopting a uniform standard for 
initial and subsequent § 2255 motions). But see Raines v. United States, 898 F.3d 680, 685 (6th Cir. 
2018) (distinguishing earlier Sixth Circuit precedent endorsing preponderance-of-the-evidence on the 
basis that it involved a successive, rather than initial, § 2255 motion). Thus, while courts have framed 
the question differently in different contexts—in terms of § 2244(b) on successive motions and in terms 
of § 2255(b) on initial motions—the question in either case is whether the movant “relies on” Johnson.  
69. See Clay, 921 F.3d at 553.  











on the basis that he had not demonstrated that his sentence had been 
enhanced in reliance upon the residual clause and because, even if Clay had 
made such a demonstration, his prior convictions nonetheless qualified as 
predicate offenses under the enumerated offenses clause.70 Clay sought—
and was denied—a certificate of appealability from the district court.71 Clay 
then sought—and was granted—a certificate of appealability from the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals on two issues, one of which was “whether a 
prisoner seeking the district court’s authorization to file a successive § 2255 
motion raising a Johnson claim must establish that he was sentenced under 
the residual clause to show that the claim relies on Johnson.”72  
The court in Clay acknowledged the circuit split as well as its previous 
decisions on the issue of the standard of proof in Wiese and Taylor.73 Clay 
argued that he was entitled to relief because the sentencing judge had 
necessarily deemed his prior convictions to be predicate offenses under the 
residual clause.74 In the alternative, Clay argued that, where the prior 
convictions could have been deemed to be predicate offenses under more 
than one theory and the record is unclear as to which theory the sentencing 
judge actually employed, the “court should apply the rule of lenity and give 
him the benefit of the doubt.”75 While the court rejected the argument that 
Clay must have been sentenced under the unconstitutional residual clause, 
the court acknowledged the alternative argument that Clay may have been 
convicted on that basis:  
Without conviction records, this court cannot conclusively determine 
which statute(s) Clay was convicted of violating—and, accordingly, 
whether his prior convictions for “house burglary” qualified as 
“violent felonies” under the ACCA’s enumerated offenses clause. 
Therefore, this court cannot rule out the possibility that the 
sentencing court relied solely on the residual clause to impose Clay’s 
ACCA-enhanced sentence.76 
Accordingly, the court explicitly acknowledged that, unlike Taylor (in 
which the Fifth Circuit held the movant would win under either standard)77 
and Wiese (in which the Fifth Circuit held the movant would lose under 
 
70. Id. at 553–54.  
71. Id. at 554.  
72. Id.  
73. Id. at 554–55. 
74. Id. at 555. 
75. Id. This argument is, in essence, an argument to extend the “Stromberg principle” beyond 
the context of general jury verdicts. See infra note 139 and accompanying text.  
76. Clay, 921 F.3d at 558. 












either standard),78 Clay’s case was “a situation where the standard of proof 
makes a difference to the outcome.”79 
With the issue of the standard of proof squarely before it, the Fifth Circuit 
sided with those circuits that had adopted the preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard.80 In support of its decision, the Fifth Circuit cited the 
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard’s consistency with the “general 
civil standard for review” as well as the “stringent and limited approach of” 
AEDPA.81 Consequently, Clay lost his appeal, and the district court’s 
dismissal of his § 2255 post-Johnson motion was affirmed.82 On January 
13, 2020, the United States Supreme Court denied Clay’s petition for a writ 
of certiorari, ending Clay’s chances for relief under Johnson and leaving 
unresolved the circuit split regarding the standard of proof courts should use 
in evaluating claims for relief under Johnson.83 
II. WHY CLAY WAS WRONGLY DECIDED 
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Clay was incorrect for two main reasons. 
First, the Clay decision is inconsistent with the current state of the law as 
expressed in statute and Supreme Court precedent regarding the ACCA’s 
residual clause. Second, the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard 
adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Clay leads to inconsistent and unjust results.  
A. Clay Is Inconsistent with the Law Governing Collateral Relief for 
Federal Prisoners 
1. The Presumption of Finality Is Not Absolute  
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Clay, along with the decisions of its sister 
circuits adopting the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for Johnson 
relief, is incorrect in its application of the current state of the law regarding 
collateral relief for federal prisoners. In short, the Clay decision was 
 
78. United States v. Wiese, 896 F.3d 720, 724–25 (5th Cir. 2018). 
79. Clay, 921 F.3d at 558. The Fifth Circuit explained: 
On the record before this court, Clay has shown that the sentencing court “may have” relied on 
the residual clause to enhance his sentence. Therefore, if this court adopts the standard 
articulated by the Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, Clay will have sustained his burden of proof . . . . 
However, Clay has not shown that the sentencing court “more likely than not” relied on the 
residual clause . . . . Therefore, if this court adopts the standard articulated by the First, Third, 
Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, Clay will have failed to prove that his successive 
§ 2255 petition relies on Johnson . . . . 
Id.  
80. Id. at 558–59.  
81. Id. at 559 (quoting Wiese, 896 F.3d at 724).  
82. Clay, 921 F.3d at 559. 
83. Clay v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 866, 866 (2020) (mem.).  











grounded largely upon AEDPA’s “stringent and limited approach,”84 which 
is to say it was grounded largely upon respect for the presumption of 
finality,85 but an analysis of the court’s opinion reveals that the Fifth Circuit 
has conflated a presumption of finality with the notion that criminal 
judgments should be virtually impervious to attack.86 As Congress has made 
clear in statutes and the Supreme Court has made clear in its decisions, 
however, the presumption of finality is merely that: a presumption.87 And 
like all presumptions, the presumption of finality can be overcome.88 
Congress and the Supreme Court have likewise indicated by their actions in 
analogous situations that collateral attacks in response to a change in 
substantive law like the one announced in Johnson is a circumstance in 
which the presumption of finality should be defeated and relief should be 
afforded.89  
While the inclusion of the word “presumption” should be enough to 
indicate that finality is not absolute, Congress’s statutory scheme also 
indicates that certain criminal judgments should be subject to collateral 
attack.90 The Fifth Circuit in Clay cited AEDPA’s “stringent and limited 
approach” as a justification for adopting the harsher preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard in Johnson collateral review.91 While there is no denying 
AEDPA is harsh in some respects92 and that its purpose is to make collateral 
attacks more burdensome for movants in certain circumstances,93 AEDPA 
 
84. One of the two justifications the Clay court cited in favor of adopting the preponderance-of-
the-evidence standard was “the stringent and limited approach of [AEDPA].” Clay, 921 F.3d at 559 
(quoting Wiese, 896 F.3d at 724). The other justification was that the standard “comports with the general 
civil standard for review.” Id. However, this is not a normative argument for what the standard of proof 
in this context should be as much as an (unsupported) observation about what the most common or 
“default” civil standard of proof is. In any case, preponderance-of-the-evidence certainly is not the only 
civil standard of proof, nor is it even the only civil standard of proof in the context of § 2255. See 28 
U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1) (2012) (requiring “clear and convincing” standard for successive motions based on 
newly discovered evidence).  
85. Courts have recognized that the presumption of finality is “an animating principle of 
AEDPA.” Dimott v. United States, 881 F.3d 232, 240 (1st Cir. 2018); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 
U.S. 420, 436 (2000) (noting that “finality” is one of AEDPA’s purposes). 
86. Cf. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982) (noting that principle of finality “must yield to 
the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration” in certain circumstances).  
87. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (allowing for post-conviction relief in certain circumstances); Henderson 
v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 n.13 (1977) (noting that the presumption of finality must be overcome 
before post-conviction relief may be granted).  
88. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993) (holding that “final and presumptively 
correct convictions” may be overturned if habeas petitioner can satisfy the Kotteakos harmless-error 
standard).  
89. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2018); see also infra note 135 and accompanying text.  
90. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).  
91. United States v. Clay, 921 F.3d 550, 559 (5th Cir. 2019). 
92. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.  
93. See, e.g., Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 648 (2010) (noting that “AEDPA seeks to 













was not designed to make collateral attack impossible.94 On the contrary, 
AEDPA reenacted § 2255, which explicitly requires courts to grant 
collateral relief “[i]f . . . the sentence imposed was not authorized by law.”95 
Thus, while AEDPA no doubt contains procedural hurdles, it also creates 
pathways to collateral relief, and so the hurdles should not be construed so 
broadly as to swallow up § 2255 and deprive it of effect entirely.  
The Supreme Court has recognized the limits of the presumption of 
finality in its decisions as well.96 In Welch itself, the Court recognized that 
the retroactivity of a new rule of constitutional law depends on “a balance 
between, first, the need for finality in criminal cases, and second, the 
countervailing imperative to ensure that criminal punishment is imposed 
only when authorized by law.”97 Thus, a court deciding an issue on collateral 
review should not reflexively deny relief to the movant on the basis of the 
presumption of finality. Instead, the presumption of finality is merely one 
side of a balancing test, the other side of which is the “imperative” that 
unconstitutional sentences be corrected.98 In the words of Justice Harlan, 
“[t]here is little societal interest in permitting the criminal process to rest at 
a point where it ought properly never to repose.”99 Thus, when a judgment 
has been rendered contrary to law, the presumption of finality is at its 
weakest.100 In those circumstances, the quantum of evidence necessary to 
tip the balance in the favor of the movant should not be unduly high.  
2. Johnson Represents One of the Circumstances in Which the 
Presumption of Finality Should Be Overcome 
Given that the presumption of finality must give way in at least some 
circumstances, the question becomes, “In which circumstances?” The 
answer is found in an analysis of the statutory scheme and caselaw 
surrounding collateral attacks. When there has been a change in substantive 
 
Cir. 2000) (noting that AEDPA increased burdens for movants on second or successive habeas motions), 
on reh’g, 245 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 2001); Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 (2001) (noting that AEDPA 
“promotes the exhaustion of state remedies while respecting the interest in the finality of state court 
judgments”).  
94. See, e.g., Holland, 560 U.S. at 649 (“When Congress codified new rules governing this 
previously judicially managed area of law, it did so without losing sight of the fact that the ‘writ of 
habeas corpus plays a vital role in protecting constitutional rights.’” (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 
U.S. 473, 483 (2000))). Thus, while one of the goals of AEDPA was, for example, to reduce delays in 
federal habeas proceedings, “[i]t did not seek to end every possible delay at all costs.” Id.  
95. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).  
96. Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1266 (2016). 
97. Id.  
98. Id. 
99. Id. (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part)).  
100. Id.  











law that renders previous judgments unconstitutional (such as the change 
announced in Johnson),101 the status quo of the wrongfully sentenced 
prisoners is one of those points where, in Justice Harlan’s words, the 
criminal process “ought properly never to repose.”102 This is evident both 
from the text of § 2255103 itself and the Supreme Court’s decades-long 
struggles with the ACCA’s residual clause.104  
AEDPA itself, for all its harshness, provides for scenarios in which the 
presumption of finality should give way. For example, one of the stringent 
procedural hurdles imposed on habeas movants by AEDPA is a one-year 
statute of limitations.105 Ordinarily, the statute of limitations runs from “the 
date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final.”106 However, the 
statute of limitations is pushed back in certain circumstances, including 
when the right asserted “has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court 
and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.”107 This 
exception, which allows for the habeas petitions of Johnson movants who 
were sentenced more than a year before Johnson was announced,108 reveals 
that Congress has decided that a Johnson-type scenario (that is, one in which 
a new, retroactive substantive rule of law is announced)109 should trigger 
more equitable exceptions to AEDPA’s ordinarily harsh rules. The 
presumption of finality, in other words, gives way in certain circumstances, 
 
101. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015); Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1265. 
102. Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
103. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2012).  
104. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2559 (noting Johnson was the Court’s “fifth [case] about the 
meaning of the residual clause”); see also infra notes 112–115 and accompanying text.  
105. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) reads: 
(f) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation 
period shall run from the latest of— 
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final; 
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action 
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant 
was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action; 
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if 
that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively 
applicable to cases on collateral review; or 
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been 
discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 
While AEDPA retained much of the language from previous versions of § 2255, the statute of limitations 
was a new addition in AEDPA. Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 198 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Prior to 
AEDPA, there was no specific period of limitation governing federal habeas corpus petitions . . . .”). 
106. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1).  
107. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3)–(4). The other circumstances are when the movant is prevented from 
making a motion by illegal governmental action and when the facts supporting the claim were not 
initially known or discoverable through the exercise of due diligence. Id.  
108. See, e.g., Cross v. United States, 892 F.3d 288, 293–94 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting that movants’ 
post-Johnson motions were timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3)).  












and Congress through § 2255(f)(3) has singled out a Johnson-type scenario 
as one of those situations.110  
The Supreme Court’s decades-long effort to salvage the residual clause 
(which ultimately proved to be in vain) also indicates that the decision in 
Johnson was meant to have substantial consequences.111 In its decisions 
involving the ACCA’s residual clause prior to Johnson, the Court refined 
its interpretation of the statute four times in order to save the clause from 
unconstitutionality.112 In Johnson, Justice Scalia wrote that “this Court's 
repeated attempts and repeated failures to craft a principled and objective 
standard out of the residual clause confirm its hopeless indeterminacy.”113 
In recognition of this unworkability, the Court acknowledged explicitly that 
it had to go against the weight of stare decisis in order to render its decision 
striking down the residual clause.114 In a vehement dissent, Justice Alito 
agreed that to overrule precedent that had been so frequently and so recently 
reaffirmed time and time again was extraordinary.115 Related to the principle 
of stare decisis is the principle of constitutional avoidance, under which 
courts are supposed to decide cases on non-constitutional grounds if at all 
possible.116 What these principles of constitutional lawmaking have in 
common is that they are undergirded by an understanding that new rules of 
constitutional law have a disruptive effect on the legal system and a society 
 
110. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3).  
111. In addition to suggesting that striking down the residual clause was understood and intended 
to have significant consequences, the Supreme Court’s repeated attempts to salvage the residual clause 
exacerbated the problem of unclear records on collateral attack. See infra Section II.B.2.  
112. See Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009), abrogated by Johnson v. United States, 
135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008), abrogated by Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 
2551; James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007), overruled by Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 2551. In a 
dissenting opinion in Sykes v. United States, Justice Scalia wrote: 
[T]his case is “another in a series” . . . . More specifically, it is an attempt to clarify, for the 
fourth time since 2007, what distinguishes “violent felonies” under the residual clause of the 
[ACCA] from other crimes. . . .  
As was perhaps predictable, instead of producing a clarification of the Delphic residual 
clause, today’s opinion produces a fourth ad hoc judgment that will sow further confusion. 
Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 28 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted), 
overruled by Johnson, 135 S. Ct. 2551.  
113. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558. See also id. at 2573 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(“Having damaged the residual clause through our misguided jurisprudence, we have no right to send 
this provision back to Congress and ask for a new one.”).  
114. Id. at 2563 (majority opinion).  
115. Id. at 2575 (Alito, J., dissenting). The justices’ agreement on this point is particularly 
compelling given that Justice Alito’s dissent is in disagreement with the majority opinion on virtually 
every other issue. Id. at 2573. 
116. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if 
there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”).  











that make decisions in reliance on the consistency of the law.117 The desire 
to avoid such disruption may be one argument against making new rules of 
constitutional law, but once a new rule of constitutional law has been 
announced, disruption is to be expected.118  
In light of the Court’s long struggle with the residual clause and the 
weight of bedrock principles of constitutional interpretation favoring its 
continued validity, the Court’s decision in Johnson should be seen as a 
reasoned and knowing departure from well-established law. As such, it 
should not be surprising that Johnson might disrupt the status quo of finality 
in collateral attacks.119 Indeed, Justice Alito likened the potential fallout 
from Johnson to “a nuclear explosion.”120 That is not to say that the effect 
of Johnson should be to upend the law of collateral attacks or entirely 
overwhelm legitimate concerns about the federal docket’s caseload.121 What 
the Supreme Court’s trepidation in rendering the Johnson decision should 
demonstrate, though, is that the abrogation of the residual clause was meant 
to have consequences, even disruptive ones. And in fact the Supreme Court 
has extended its holding in Johnson to other federal statutes that include 
residual clauses whose language resembles that of the ACCA, proving the 
contention that Johnson was meant to substantially alter the law.122 As such, 
the notion that it would be disruptive to give effect to Johnson by 
reconsidering sentence enhancements that were possibly decided on the 
basis of the residual clause, while perhaps an accurate observation, is not a 
compelling argument for imposing a high burden on movants. The Court in 
Johnson acknowledged123 Justice Alito’s dissent predicting disarray as a 
result of the abrupt abandonment of such firmly established precedent,124 
 
117. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (“Stare decisis is the preferred course 
because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters 
reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial 
process.” (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265–266 (1986))); Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 345 
(acknowledging “great gravity and delicacy” of decisions concerning constitutionality of Congressional 
acts). 
118. See, e.g., Cross v. United States, 892 F.3d 288, 296 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[W]hen the Supreme 
Court reverses course, the change generally indicates an abrupt shift in law.”). 
119. Id. 
120. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2577 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
121. Indeed, available figures suggest that federal courts’ caseloads in the wake of Johnson spiked 
substantially. United States v. St. Hubert, 918 F.3d 1174, 1179 (11th Cir. 2019) (Tjoflat, J., concurring 
in the denial of rehearing en banc) (indicating a ten-fold increase in successive § 2255 motions in the 
year following Johnson).  
122. See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1210–11 (2018) (citing Johnson and holding 
unconstitutional the Immigration and Nationality Act’s definition of “crime of violence,” which contains 
a residual clause virtually identical to the one in the ACCA); United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 
(2019) (citing Johnson and holding unconstitutional the residual clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which 
concerns the use of a firearm in connection with certain crimes).  
123. See, e.g., Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558, 2560, 2562 (responding to Justice Alito’s dissenting 
opinion). 












but the Court struck down the ACCA’s residual clause nonetheless.125 In 
short, lower courts should not attempt to blunt the effect of Johnson due to 
concerns over disruption because the Supreme Court knew—and perhaps 
even intended—that Johnson would be disruptive.126  
3. Post-Johnson Movants Should Get the Benefit of the Doubt When 
the Record Is Unclear 
The Supreme Court’s decisions involving another aspect of the ACCA—
the modified categorical approach127—provide an example of lenity in the 
face of uncertainty that should be followed in determining the standard of 
proof required after Johnson. Prior to 1986, the only predicate offenses 
under the ACCA were “robbery or burglary,” each of which was defined 
more specifically in the statute.128 When the ACCA acquired its current 
form in 1986 (in which the definitions of the enumerated clauses were 
eliminated and the residual clause was added, among other changes),129 the 
Supreme Court was faced with the question of how to determine whether a 
given conviction qualified as an ACCA predicate offense.130  
In Taylor v. United States, the Supreme Court adopted the categorical 
approach, which requires courts to consider not the facts of the particular 
instance of the crime on which conviction was based but rather the elements 
of the offense in the abstract.131 When a statute provides for multiple means 
by which a crime may be committed, a conviction under that statute may 
qualify as a predicate offense if the crime was accomplished by one means 
but not if it was accomplished by another means.132 In these situations, the 
 
125. Id. at 2563 (majority opinion).  
126. See Cross v. United States, 892 F.3d 288, 296 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[W]hen the Supreme Court 
reverses course, the change generally indicates an abrupt shift in law.”).  
127.  Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990) (describing the modified categorical 
approach); Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016) (citing Taylor and referring to this 
approach as the “modified categorical approach”).  
128. Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1803(2), 98 Stat. 2185; Taylor, 
495 U.S. at 581. 
129.  Career Criminals Amendment Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207–39; Taylor, 495 
U.S. at 582.  
130. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 580 (“On the face of the federal enhancement provision, it is not readily 
apparent whether Congress intended ‘burglary’ to mean whatever the State of the defendant’s prior 
conviction defines as burglary, or whether it intended that some uniform definition of burglary be applied 
to all cases in which the Government seeks a § 924(e) enhancement.”).  
131. Id. at 600; see also supra note 32 and accompanying text.  
132. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016) (“This case concerns a . . . law . . . that 
enumerates various factual means of committing a single element.”). In Mathis, the Supreme Court 
considered whether a conviction under an Iowa statute, which defined a type of burglary that could be 
accomplished by multiple means, could count as a predicate offense under the ACCA. Id. at 2249–50. 
This type of analysis, however, requires reference to another legal invention that leads to even more 
wrinkles in ACCA caselaw: the “generic” version of crimes. Id. “Generic burglary,” for example, is 
 











Court has approved use of a “modified categorical approach,” under which 
courts look beyond the mere fact of conviction “to a limited class of 
documents (for example, the indictment, jury instructions, or plea 
agreement and colloquy) to determine what crime, with what elements, a 
defendant was convicted of.”133 When those documents do not prove with 
certainty the set of elements under which the defendant was convicted, 
however, it is impossible to say whether the prior conviction qualifies as a 
predicate offense.134 Since Taylor, the Supreme Court has clarified the effect 
of unclear records in the context of determining whether a given state statute 
qualifies as an ACCA predicate offense, holding that “Taylor’s demand for 
certainty” will not support a sentence enhancement on the basis of an 
unclear record.135 By contrast, the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard 
permits an ACCA sentence enhancement to stand when the record is unclear 
as to whether it was imposed unconstitutionally on the basis of the residual 
clause.136 As such, the standard adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Clay seems 
to fly in the face of the Supreme Court’s ACCA jurisprudence by allowing 
sentence enhancements to stand when the record is unclear.137  
The reasoning behind Taylor’s “demand for certainty”138 also underlies 
the analogous principle from Stromberg v. California.139 The Stromberg 
principle holds that when a jury delivers a general verdict that could have 
rested on more than one ground, one of which is later deemed to be 
 
defined as “having the basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building 
or structure, with intent to commit a crime.” United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068, 1072 (8th Cir. 
2015) (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016).  
133. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. at 2249. 
134. See, e.g., Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602 (overturning ACCA sentence enhancement because “it is 
not apparent to us from the sparse record before us which of [various burglary] statutes were the bases 
for [petitioner’s] prior convictions”).  
135. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. at 2257 (“Of course, such record materials will not in 
every case speak plainly, and if they do not, a sentencing judge will not be able to satisfy ‘Taylor’s 
demand for certainty’ when determining whether a defendant was convicted of a generic offense.” 
(quoting Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 21 (2005)).  
136. United States v. Clay, 921 F.3d 550, 558–59 (5th Cir. 2019). 
137. In other words, had the charging documents, sentencing colloquy, etc. relating to Clay’s prior 
convictions been ambiguous as to whether Clay’s prior convictions had been for valid predicate offenses, 
Taylor would require Clay’s sentence enhancement to be vacated. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 21. By contrast, 
under the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Clay, ambiguity in those same documents as to which clause of the 
ACCA formed the basis of the sentence enhancement does not require the sentence to be vacated. Clay, 
921 F.3d at 558–59; see also supra note 65 and accompanying text.  
138. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 21. 
139. In Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), the Supreme Court reviewed the decision 
of a California court in which the defendant was convicted for violating a statute that criminalized 
displaying flags or banners in any of several manners. The defendant was convicted on a general verdict 
that “did not specify the ground upon which it rested.” Id. at 367–68. On appeal, the statute was partially 
struck down as unconstitutional, but the appellate court upheld the conviction as having been based on 
other, constitutional provisions of the statute. Id. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding 
that the conviction could not stand because one of the provisions was unconstitutional, and it was 












unconstitutional, and it is not clear on which ground the verdict rested, that 
verdict cannot stand.140 In United States v. Geozos, the Ninth Circuit 
analogized to the Stromberg principle in adopting the may-have standard 
for relief under Johnson.141 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that if a jury verdict 
that was possibly unconstitutional cannot stand, neither should a sentence 
enhancement that was possibly unconstitutional.142 Applying this reasoning 
to a Johnson claim, the Geozos court held that an ACCA sentence 
enhancement could not stand when the record was unclear as to which 
clause of the ACCA the movant’s sentence enhancement was based upon.143 
Instead, where either positive evidence or a lack of a clear record raises the 
possibility that the unconstitutionally vague residual clause was the basis 
for enhancement, the sentence must be vacated.144 The Stromberg principle 
and the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor thus stand for the proposition 
that, when an unclear record gives rise to the possibility that a criminal 
conviction or sentence was imposed unconstitutionally, courts should err on 
the side of lenity.145  
B. The Preponderance-of-the-Evidence Standard Announced in Clay Is 
Unfair  
In addition to being incongruous with the law governing federal habeas 
proceedings as contained in relevant statutes, Supreme Court precedent, and 
principles from analogous areas of law, the preponderance-of-the-evidence 
standard the Fifth Circuit adopted in Clay is unfair and unjust. The standard 
leads to inconsistent results based on little more than happenstance.146 While 
inconsistency is in and of itself undesirable in the law,147 especially within 
 
140. United States v. Geozos, 870 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[W]here a provision of the 
Constitution forbids conviction on a particular ground, the constitutional guarantee is violated by a 
general verdict that may have rested on that ground.” (quoting Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 53 
(1991))). 
141. Id. 
142. Id. (“[I]t does not follow that, when a judge makes a finding that a defendant qualifies for an 
enhanced sentence, and that finding may rest on an unconstitutional ground, the finding should be treated 
any differently than a finding made by a jury for the purpose of conviction.”).  
143. Id. (“We are persuaded that a rule analogous to the Stromberg principle should apply in the 
sentencing context.”).  
144. Id.  
145. Id. (“Indeed, treating [Stromberg situations and Johnson situations] differently because one 
involves sentencing and the other involves conviction would be contrary to the principle that any ‘fact 
increasing either end of [a sentencing] range produces a new penalty and constitutes an ingredient of the 
offense.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013))).  
146. See infra Section II.B.1.  
147. Cf. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989) (“[A] traditional 
justification for overruling a prior case is that a precedent may be a positive detriment to coherence and 
consistency in the law . . . .”).  











the context of the criminal law,148 inconsistency is especially unwelcome in 
the context of habeas relief under the ACCA. This is because § 2255 
motions challenging ACCA enhancements necessarily involve sentences of 
at least fifteen years in prison, and such sentences demand fairness and 
equitable administration.149 The preponderance-of-the-evidence standard 
does not meet this demand because it will require some movants to spend 
years in prison serving out unconstitutional sentences for no reason other 
than the bad luck of having a sentencing judge who was inexplicit at the 
time of sentencing.150 These problems are exacerbated by the Supreme 
Court’s having repeatedly and consistently upheld the constitutionality of 
the ACCA and its residual clause.151 Because sentencing judges had been 
continually reassured by way of successive Supreme Court opinions that the 
residual clause was constitutional, judges had no reason to believe there was 
constitutional significance in which clause of the ACCA the sentence 
enhancement was based.152 As such, judges would have had little reason to 
memorialize their thought process at the time of sentencing, potentially 
leading to a greater quantity of unclear records on collateral review.153 
1. The Preponderance-of-the-Evidence Standard Leads to Inconsistent 
Results  
What is at stake in the debate between higher and lower standards for 
Johnson relief was explained best by the Eleventh Circuit in In re Chance.154 
The court referenced an example “involving two defendants, sentenced on 
the same day, for the same offense, by the same judge, with the same ACCA 
predicates.”155 If the judge sentenced both defendants under the residual 
clause but only made that basis explicit in one of the cases, then only one of 
the defendants would get relief under the preponderance-of-the-evidence 
standard.156 Such disparate outcomes offend basic notions of fairness 
 
148. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987) (citing “principle of treating similarly situated 
defendants the same”).  
149. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2560 (2015) (“Invoking so shapeless a 
provision to condemn someone to prison for 15 years to life does not comport with the Constitution's 
guarantee of due process.”).  
150. See, e.g., In re Chance, 831 F.3d 1335, 1340–41 (11th Cir. 2016). 
151. See infra Section II.B.2.  
152. United States v. Bennerman, 785 F. App’x 958, 961 (4th Cir. 2019). 
153. In re Chance, 831 F.3d at 1340 (“Nothing in the law requires a judge to specify which clause 
of § 924(c)—residual or elements clause—it relied upon in imposing a sentence.”).  
154. Id. at 1340–41. 
155. Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215, 1228–29 (11th Cir. 2017) (Williams, J., dissenting) 
(citing In re Chance, 831 F.3d at 1341).  












because “selective application of new rules violates the principle of treating 
similarly situated defendants the same.”157 
Accordingly, inconsistent results, on their own, are undesirable because 
they reflect arbitrariness in the law—the very thing the decision in Johnson 
itself was designed to eliminate by striking down the ACCA’s residual 
clause as unconstitutionally vague.158 The circumstances of the 
inconsistency at issue here, however, mean that not only will winners and 
losers be determined arbitrarily, but the United States will detain the losers 
in federal prison for years longer than the constitution would permit, if not 
for a judge’s brevity at sentencing.159 This is unacceptable.160 As the court 
wrote in Johnson, “Invoking so shapeless a provision [as the ACCA’s 
residual clause] to condemn someone to prison for 15 years to life does not 
comport with the Constitution's guarantee of due process.”161 Determining 
whether someone must serve out such a sentence on the basis of “whether 
the district court used the words ‘residual clause’ at his potentially decades-
old sentencing”162 is equally offensive to due process. This possibility that 
a movant’s remaining in prison might depend on what the sentencing judge 
decided to commit to the record is not a remote possibility trotted out in a 
parade of horribles; in Clay itself, the record on collateral review was 
unclear in part because defense counsel saw no occasion to ensure that the 
record reflected which clause of the ACCA the sentence enhancement was 
based on.163 The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that it could not “rule out the 
possibility that the sentencing court relied solely on the residual clause to 
impose Clay’s ACCA-enhanced sentence.”164 This means, in no uncertain 
 
157. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987) (citing Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 
258–59 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).  
158. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015) (holding the residual clause 
unconstitutionally vague because it “both denies fair notice to defendants and invites arbitrary 
enforcement by judges”).  
159. See United States v. Winston, 850 F.3d 677, 682 (4th Cir. 2017) (suggesting that denying 
Johnson relief due to an unclear record “penalize[s] a movant for a court’s discretionary choice not to 
specify under which clause of Section 924(e)(2)(B) an offense qualified as a violent felony”).  
160. The seemingly obvious proposition that whether someone spends additional years in prison 
should depend on more than sheer luck is, apparently, controversial. In Beeman v. United States, the 
Eleventh Circuit wrote:  
 Nor are we persuaded by Beeman’s argument that requiring a § 2255 movant raising a 
Johnson claim to carry his burden of proof and persuasion would make the outcome depend on 
the “fluke” of a district court having expressly stated which clause it was relying on. If true, 
that would be equally true whichever side bears the burden. It is no more arbitrary to have the 
movant lose in a § 2255 proceeding because of a silent record than to have the Government 
lose because of one. 
871 F.3d at 1223–24. 
161. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2560. 
162. In re Chance, 831 F.3d 1335, 1340 (11th Cir. 2016).  
163. United States v. Clay, 921 F.3d 550, 556 (5th Cir. 2019); see also supra note 65 and 
accompanying text.  
164. Clay, 921 F.3d at 558. 











terms, that the Fifth Circuit recognized that Glen B. Clay’s sentence very 
well could have been unconstitutional, but the court decided to err on the 
side of imprisonment in the face of a silent record.165 
2. The Problem Is Compounded by the Supreme Court’s Failure to 
Recognize the Unconstitutionality of the Residual Clause Prior to 
Johnson 
The Supreme Court’s delay in striking down the residual clause is 
regrettable for the simple reason that it permitted the imposition of 
unconstitutional sentence enhancements under the residual clause for nearly 
three decades.166 However, the Court’s meandering path toward finally 
striking down the residual clause in Johnson was damaging for the 
additional reason that it exacerbated the problem of unclear records on 
collateral review.167 Without the Supreme Court’s insistence that the 
residual clause was firmly established as constitutional, judges and 
defendants might have had more reason to insist that the record be more 
explicit due to the possibility that the basis for enhancement would have 
constitutional significance.168 Instead, the Supreme Court repeatedly upheld 
the residual clause’s constitutionality,169 and so “courts had little reason to 
think the choice [of which clause formed the basis of the sentence 
enhancement] would matter.”170 Since judges and defense counsel believed 
it made no difference whether a sentence enhancement was based on the 
residual clause as opposed to, say, the elements clause,171 sentencing records 
reflected this indifference through their silence on the matter.172 It is a cruel 
irony that some movants may be forced to serve out unconstitutional prison 
 
165. Id. at 558–59. In the words of the Fourth Circuit, courts adopting the preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard have essentially decided to “penalize a movant for a court’s discretionary choice not 
to specify under which clause of Section 924(e)(2)(B) an offense qualified as a violent felony.” United 
States v. Winston, 850 F.3d 677, 682 (4th Cir. 2017). 
166. See In re PSLJ, Inc., 904 F.2d 701, 701 (4th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (“It is a time-honored 
statement that ‘justice delayed is justice denied . . . .’”).  
167. United States v. Bennerman, 785 F. App’x 958, 961 (4th Cir. 2019). 
168. Ironically, the “relevant background legal environment” concept is turned on its head when 
seen in this light. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text. Courts like the Ninth Circuit have cited 
the “relevant background legal environment” as a ground for upholding a sentence enhancement despite 
an unclear record. United States v. Geozos, 870 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 2017). However, given the 
residual clause’s pedigree of constitutionality prior to Johnson, the “background legal environment” 
would seem to indicate that a judge would have thought herself on firm constitutional ground in relying 
on the residual clause. See Cross v. United States, 892 F.3d 288, 296 (7th Cir. 2018). 
169. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2573 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
majority for striking down the residual clause “even though we have twice rejected that very argument 
within the last eight years”); Cross, 892 F.3d at 296 (“Until Johnson, the Supreme Court had been 
engaged in a painful effort to make sense of the residual clause.”).  
170. Bennerman, 785 F. App’x at 961. 
171. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 












sentences because the Supreme Court was so adamant about the residual 
clause’s constitutionality before “the Court made a U-turn and tossed out 
the ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague.”173 
An illustration of this point can be seen in an analogy to the concept of 
non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel (NMOCE).174 NMOCE refers to a 
situation in which a defendant is sued by two different plaintiffs over the 
same issue. If the defendant loses the first case, should that judgment be 
used against the defendant in the second case to estop him from relitigating 
an issue on which he has already lost? The Supreme Court has permitted 
NMOCE in certain circumstances, but it has also noted the potential of 
NMOCE to be “unfair” to defendants: “If a defendant in the first action is 
sued for small or nominal damages, he may have little incentive to defend 
vigorously, particularly if future suits are not foreseeable.”175 In light of this 
and other potential sources of unfairness, a plaintiff attempting to assert 
NMOCE must satisfy certain criteria, including that “there was a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate the identical issue in the prior action.”176 Due also 
to these concerns, NMOCE is considerably more limited in the criminal 
context than the civil context.177 
The same concerns about incentives are present in the context of post-
Johnson relief.178 Because the Supreme Court had reiterated the 
constitutionality of the residual clause time and time again,179 “future suits” 
regarding which clause of the ACCA supported the sentence enhancement 
were “not foreseeable” at the time of sentencing.180 As such, the “defendant 
in the first action” would have had “little incentive” to litigate the issue of 
which clause applied.181 For the same reasons the use of NMOCE against 
criminal defendants is disfavored, the potential for detrimental reliance 
upon the Supreme Court’s repeated affirmations of the residual clause’s 
 
173. Cross, 892 F.3d at 296. 
174. “Collateral estoppel” is sometimes referred to as “issue preclusion.” Yeager v. United States, 
557 U.S. 110, 119 n.4 (2009). 
175. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979) (citing The Evergreens v. Nunan, 
141 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir. 1944)). 
176. Syverson v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 472 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2007).  
177. See Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 25 (1980) (noting that “‘[t]he public interest in 
the accuracy and justice of criminal results’ . . . outweigh[s] the economy concerns that undergird the 
estoppel doctrine” in the civil context (quoting United States v. Standefer, 610 F.2d 1076, 1093 (3d Cir. 
1980))). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has not banned the use of NMOCE against criminal defendants 
entirely, and some courts continue to allow it. See State v. Huffine, 422 P.3d 102, 109–11 (Mont. 2018) 
(collecting cases and noting that only one federal circuit allows for NMOCE against criminal 
defendants).  
178. See Cross, 892 F.3d at 296. 
179. See supra notes 112–115 and accompanying text.  
180. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 330. 
181. Id.  











constitutionality should militate against upholding ACCA sentence 
enhancements on the basis of an incomplete record.  
At least one court has recognized (in a slightly different context) the 
possibility that defendants and their counsel could have relied to their 
detriment on the Supreme Court’s repeated confirmations of the validity of 
the residual clause.182 In Cross v. United States, the Seventh Circuit 
considered the § 2255 motions of two prisoners who challenged their 
sentences under a provision of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines that was 
virtually identical to the ACCA’s residual clause.183 The government argued 
the movants’ claims should be denied for failure to challenge the 
constitutionality of the residual clause at trial.184 Noting that prior to 
Johnson, the Supreme Court “took the position that the validity of the 
residual clause was so clear that it could summarily reject” arguments to the 
contrary, the Seventh Circuit “excus[ed] . . . the petitioners’ failure to 
challenge the residual clause prior to Johnson.”185 In the same way that 
supposed certainty over the constitutionality of the residual clause would 
have kept defendants from raising the issue at trial, supposed certainty over 
the constitutionality of the residual clause would have also kept judges from 
memorializing the basis for the sentence enhancement in the record. Thus, 
for the same reasons the Seventh Circuit excused the movants in Cross, 
courts like the Fifth Circuit should not make post-Johnson movants pay the 
price for the Supreme Court’s misplaced confidence in the constitutionality 
of the residual clause in the years before Johnson.  
III. PROPOSAL 
In order to address the inconsistencies and inequities perpetuated by the 
circuit split over what standard of proof should apply to § 2255 habeas 
motions seeking relief under Johnson, the Supreme Court should take two 
actions. First, the Court should grant certiorari to one of the many petitioners 
whose claims have been denied due to an inability to meet the 
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.186 Doing so will resolve the split 
 
182. Cross, 892 F.3d 288. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 294. 
185. Id. at 296. 
186. The Supreme Court has repeatedly denied petitions for certiorari in cases involving the denial 
of post-Johnson § 2255 motions decided under the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. See Dimott 
v. United States, 881 F.3d 232 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2678 (2018) (mem.); Walker v. United 
States, 900 F.3d 1012 (8th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 2715 (2019) (mem.); United States v. 
Washington, 890 F.3d 891 (10th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 789 (2019) (mem.); Beeman v. 












among the circuits and clarify what the correct standard of proof is.187 The 
need for lenity and consistency in the context of post-Johnson relief is 
especially strong when considered in light of the many ways in which 
ACCA sentence enhancements are already on potentially precarious 
constitutional footing.188 Importantly, these same factors are among those 
considered most critical to the Supreme Court’s decision whether to grant 
certiorari in a given case.189  
Moreover, adopting the may-have standard will be unlikely to lead to the 
“nuclear explosion” Justice Alito feared when he opposed the decision in 
Johnson in the first place.190 Indeed, there are a number of considerations 
that would soften the effect of an adoption of the may-have standard. As an 
initial matter, it is important to emphasize that satisfaction of the standard 
of proof that is the subject of this Note does not lead to the movant’s 
immediate release from prison or even his sentence being overturned; 
instead, a movant who shows that he “relies” on Johnson is simply entitled 
to have his sentence corrected.191 Of course, correction of a sentence may 
result in the release of a movant if there is no legal basis for his continued 
imprisonment,192 a result that can hardly be opposed. In other cases, though, 
the remedy may be more subtle due to the fact that harmless error review 
applies in the merits phase of a § 2255 motion.193 Thus, if a movant’s 
underlying convictions qualify as predicate offenses under another clause 
of the ACCA (such as the enumerated offenses clause), the sentence 
enhancement will stand.194  
The second component of this proposal is that, in order to prevent similar 
problems in the future, the Supreme Court should extend the applicability 
 
187. Cf. Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449, 452 (2012) (deciding a case in order “to 
resolve a split among the Circuits”).  
188. For example, due to the categorical approach, someone convicted of a “violent felony” need 
not actually have acted violently. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. As the Supreme Court has 
noted, there are potential Sixth Amendment concerns regarding the ACCA. See supra note 32 and 
accompanying text. Some circuits permit judges to rely on their apprehension of the “relevant legal 
background environment” at the time of sentencing instead of looking to the record. See supra notes 58–
59. Moreover, the risk of error is compounded by the fact that habeas challenges to ACCA sentence 
enhancements necessarily involve multiple proceedings, possibly in different jurisdictions and spread 
over decades. Given the risk for error—and the grave consequences inherent in a fifteen-year mandatory 
sentence—a just and uniform standard is badly needed.  
189. See SUP. CT. R. 10; BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, Chapter 4. Factors Motivating the Exercise 
of the Court’s Certiorari and Appellate Jurisdiction, in SUPREME COURT PRACTICE (2019) (ebook). 
190. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2577 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
191. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b) (2018).  
192. See, e.g., United States v. Geozos, 870 F.3d 890, 901 (9th Cir. 2017) (remanding with 
instructions that “Defendant be released from custody immediately”).  
193. United States v. Driscoll, 892 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 2018).  
194. See, e.g., United States v. Duran, 754 F. App’x 739, 747 (10th Cir. 2018) (affirming denial 
of Johnson § 2255 motion because any reliance on residual clause was harmless since prior convictions 
qualified as predicate offenses under elements clause and enumerated offenses clause).  











of the Stromberg principle195 to all situations in the criminal law in which a 
conviction or sentence rests on one of several possible grounds, at least one 
of which is unconstitutional. Announcing such a broad rule may lead to 
administrative difficulties in the short term, but it will serve to incentivize 
explicitness in records in criminal proceedings, which should prevent 
problems such as the post-Johnson confusion from recurring. It is 
imperative that the Supreme Court announce an extension of the Stromberg 
principle instead of hoping that lower courts will apply it on a case-by-case 
basis, as the Ninth Circuit did in Geozos.196 Otherwise, the result will simply 
be more circuit splits in which justice is distributed unequally on the basis 
of happenstance.197  
CONCLUSION 
In Johnson, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that an unconstitutionally 
vague provision may not serve as the basis for a fifteen-year prison sentence, 
and in Welch, the Court underscored the importance of its decision in 
Johnson by announcing that it must apply retroactively. The gravity of these 
decisions demands that they be given effect and not stymied by procedural 
barriers. The presumption of finality must give way in certain 
circumstances, and review of an ACCA sentence enhancement imposed on 
the basis of the residual clause is one of them. The may-have standard is the 
only standard that is capable of adequately securing justice in these 
circumstances, and so the Supreme Court should take action to make sure 
its decision in Johnson and future rulings of constitutional law are given full 
effect. 
Nicholas C. Coyle 
 
195. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.  
196. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.  
197. See supra Section II.B.1.  
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